Vizconde not a closed book

Vinculum Juris is now also on Newsbreak. Here's my first entry.

DILUTING DEFENSES

I have been a criminal defense lawyer for practically my entire career--by choice as well as by circumstance. When I started practising in 1991, I chose to lawyer for many of those whose rights were violated and who found themselves without lawyers--many of these were political offenders charged with rebellion, coup d'etat, illegal possession of firearms or explosives as well as those charged with vcrimes which would later be termed "heinous" such as murder, kidnapping, parricide, rape. In 1994, when the death penalty was reinstated in the country through RA 7659, I found myself unable to prosecute crimes which were punished by the death penalty for the simple reason that, by belief and by principle, I did not believe in the death penalty and had committed myself to opposing it with everything I had. This decision led to a 12-year abstinence (1994 to 2006, when the death penalty was prohibited by law from being imposed) from prosecuting crimes where the death penalty was imposed and a de facto criminal defense practice.

In the course of my practice, I had many occasions to encounter lawyers from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) and even the Chief Public Attorney herself. It is a matter of record, both in writing and in the occasional public talks, that I have spoken out for many public attorneys and vouched for their diligence, their competence, their industry, their passion and their commitment--having observed many of them up close. I would tell many of the inmates at the New Bilibid Prisons, back when there was a death row, that the image of the PAO as incompetent, lazy and ill-prepared was unfair because this was an office that labored mightily under a tremendous handicap--it was defending accused whom no one else wanted to defend and it was doing so under the perception that it could not win. I have, many times, praised PAO lawyers as heroic simply because many of them do their jobs well under circumstances that would be challenging to many lawyers.

That being said, I have not always seen eye to eye with the current Chief Public Attorney on many occasions but these differences have never been personal on my part. These differences, I would like to believe, were brought about by differing perceptions of strategy or tactics but never on the end goal: to render justice to the accused in a criminal case in the best way possible.

I now find myself differing again with the Chief Public Attorney in the matter of resurrecting the case against the six accused who were acquitted by the Supreme Court in the Vizconde case. I have spoken out publicly to say that the Majority Decision in the so-called Vizconde Case did not declare them innocent but simply acquitted them for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I have also spoken publicly to say that the six could no longer be prosecuted because of the prohibition against double jeopardy.

Article III, section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides explicitly that "(n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." Rule 117, section 7 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states the ban in this manner: "(w)hen an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." Simply put, double jeopardy exists when : (a) the accused has been validly charged, (b) before a court which has jurisdiction to try the case, (c) the accused has entered a plea to the charge, and (d) has been acquitted of the charge.

In possibly the only case where the Supreme Court allowed an acquittal to be reviewed, the Court nonetheless clearly showed in that case (Galman v. Sandiganbayan) that the accused therein were never in jeopardy of conviction because of the collusion that the Sandiganbayan Justices had with Mr. Marcos and thus, there was no first jeopardy. The trial at the Sandiganbayan which resulted in the acquittal of the accused was a sham, according to the Court, and thus the trial court was ousted of its jurisdiction, the accused were never in first jeopardy of conviction, thus there could be no second or double jeopardy.

In the Vizconde case, things are markedly different. The convictions were handed down by the trial court and later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It was the Supreme Court which reversed the convictions. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this case is not seriously doubted, even by the PAO Chief. This is shown very clearly by the very act of invoking that jurisdiction through a Motion for Reconsideration as well as the Motions for Intervention. This alone shows that Galman would not apply.

It is also curious that PAO, through its Chief, has entered the picture for the private complainant, Lauro Vizconde, against the accused, two of whom are still at large and may still be arrested and tried. No matter that Lauro Vizconde is, as the Chief Public Attorney claims, indigent--his counsel is no less than the National Prosecution Service represented no less than by the Solicitor General. I do not begrudge the Chief Public Attorney her feelings of sympathy for Lauro, which feelings I share, but there is more to her being PAO Chief than feelings.

The Public Attorney's Office is mandated to extend free legal services to indigent litigants in civil, criminal and administrative cases. It is, by law, an autonomous unit attached operationally to the Department of Justice. It is also de facto the legal defense unit of the government in relation to the National Prosecution Service of the DOJ which is the prosecution arm of the government.

As the Chief Defense Counsel for indigent litigants, the Chief Public Attorney must be aware that the prohibition against double jeopardy is one of the strongest and most stable defenses available to an accused in a criminal case. She must be aware that the clients of her Office may need to rely precisely on the very same defense that she now wishes to dilute on behalf of a person whom she is not, by mandate, entitled to represent. That is a danger that is far, far greater than the supposed possible miscarriage of justice that she claims will happen should Hubert Webb et al. be allowed to remain acquitted. Thus, it is inexplicable that the PAO Chief would herself dilute that protection by arguing against it in a case where she lawyers for the private complainant. I have no problem with her doing this as a private lawyer but when she argues against double jeopardy as the Chief Defense Counsel mandated by law to defend indigent accused, I have a problem with that.

The passion that the PAO Chief brings on behalf of Lauro Vizconde is admirable, however this same passion that she brings as PAO Chief is misplaced and dangerous. It sends the wrong signals to all her other clients--all those accused who may simply be relying on double jeopardy to prevent them from being re-prosecuted, wrongfully or, in the rare cases, rightfully.

When the PAO Chief, in her capacity as such, argues as forcefully as she does on behalf of a prosecution witness like Jessica Alfaro, whom the Court has already discredited, and says that the Webb alibi should not be believed, she is doing her clients a great disservice. Alibi is often the first defense available to an accused and while it is not the strongest defense available, it does get stronger when the prosecution evidence is weak. For the PAO Chief to argue against a Supreme Court Decision that now renders alibi a viable defense again is curious, if not downright dangerous, simply because it waters down a defense available to an accused--perhaps many of those which PAO represents and who are not as high profile as the Hubert Webbs of this world.

Taking up the cudgels for the private complainant in a criminal case against six accused and arguing against the very defenses her own public attorneys may have to rely on in their trials or even their appeals to the very same Supreme Court she now challenges represents a strange "conflict of interest" in that the very person tasked to push for these defenses so that they are available for her indigent clients is now the same one arguing against these defenses on behalf of one litigant.

Again, I am not opposed to the PAO Chief taking up the cudgels for Lauro Vizconde but she should do so not as PAO Chief. If she really wants to lawyer for Vizconde in this case, she should resign first and not use the resources of PAO to lawyer to dilute the defenses and for the "other side" at that.

A Toxic Deal and A Cyanide Pill

Here's my first problem with the deal that Mr. Carlos Garcia, former General and former comptroller of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into with Ms. Merceditas Gutierrez, current holder of the position of Ombudsman: it was not necessary. From all indications, the prosecution had the goods and the case was open and shut--at least according to Simeon V. Marcelo, the former Solicitor General, former Ombudsman and the last person to credibly hold those two positions in recent years. So why was the deal made and why was it made so quickly?

Here's my second problem with the deal: it also effectively prevented any inquiry into who else could have been involved in the plunder. I do not believe that anyone seriously thinks that the plunder started and stopped with Mr. Garcia. With 303 Million Pesos amassed by the AFP comptroller, there is serious doubt that this could have gone unnoticed by higher authorities who, being in a position to stop him, failed to do so. So again, why was the deal made and why was it made so quickly?

Here's my third problem with the deal: it is not allowed. Rule 116, section 2 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

"SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary."

The rules do not allow a plea bargain to be made after arraignment and after trial has started. The Justice Secretary is correct on this point.

Here's my fourth problem with the deal: plunder does not have "necessarily included offenses." Plunder is punished by a special statute, Republic Act No. 7080. In Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, the Supreme Court, speaking through then Associate (later Chief) Justice Puno, characterized plunder as a single crime and deliberately made so by act of Congress, thus:

"A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth. They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem." (citations omitted)

What this means is that Congress specifically created plunder to be a single crime consisting of various predicate acts, which may or may not be crimes in themselves.

In People v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 149495, August 21, 2003, the Supreme Court refused to consolidate an indirect bribery (Article 211, RPC) charge and a plunder charge thereby suggesting that bribery (indirect bribery is a lesser species of the offense of direct bribery, the gravamen being mere acceptance of gifts offered to the public officer by reason of his office) is not a necessary element of plunder.

Section 2 of RA 7080, defining plunder, specifies the predicate acts or crimes which may form part of a series or combination of acts to constitute plunder and these acts or crimes are found only in section 1(d), thus:

1) Misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2) Receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3) Illegally or fraudulently conveying or disposing of assets belonging to the national government;

4) Obtaining, receiving, or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) Establishing monopolies or other combinations and/or implementing decrees or orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

By the very terms of the law, only these acts may constitute plunder and thus, the theory that the offenses of direct bribery and violation of the AMLA could be considered "included" in plunder is quite irregular. The theory of "necessary inclusion" contemplates that the elements of one crime may form part of the elements of another crime. The most common and easily grasped example would be the killing of a person with criminal intent which is homicide (Article 249, RPC) which is considered "necessarily included" in murder (Article 248, RPC) because murder contemplates the killing of a person with criminal intent but with qualifying circumstances. Thus, a person charged with murder may actually be convicted of homicide because in proving murder, the prosecution would necessarily need to prove homicide--but not the other way around.

Section 4 of RA 7080 (The Plunder Law) does not require each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth to be proven as it is sufficient to establish a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the over-all unlawful scheme or conspiracy to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Note the use of "or" between "overt" and "criminal" to indicate that not every act in the pattern needs to be criminal. For Ms. Gutierrez to say that plunder, in Garcia's case, "necessarily includes" direct bribery and violation of a different provision of AMLA is to ignore the very text of the law.

Here's my fifth problem with the deal: why is Garcia not in jail after pleading guilty to two crimes? Garcia walked free on bail after pleading guilty to direct bribery (Article 210, Revised Penal Code) and violation of section 4(b) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA). The penalty for direct bribery is 6 years 1 day up to 10 years (prision mayor minimum and medium periods) and a fine not less than three times the value of the bribe, if the act subject of the bribe is a crime, plus the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon if the same shall have been committed. Even assuming this is the only crime he pleaded guilty to, he still has a few more years of jail time left. Now, here, as De Quiros would say, is the rub: the plea bargain includes a change in the AMLA provision alleged in the charge sheet from section 4(a) to section 4(b). Cosmetic change? Not quite. The section 4(a) offense carries a penalty of 7-14 years and a fine of up to 3 Million Pesos while the section 4(b) offense carries a penalty of . . . wait for it.... four to seven years and a fine of up to 1.5 Million Pesos. How long has Garcia been in jail? Almost seven years. I think we can all do the math.

Here's my sixth and last problem with the deal: there was an overwhelming absence of fanfare leading to the deal and an overabundance of alacrity in accepting the deal. Quicker than Hubert Webb could adjust to his new surroundings, Garcia was out on bail. Those who facilitated the deal are complaining that the Justice Secretary ought to wait until the Sandiganbayan can approve the deal--yet, Garcia is out of jail even before the deal is approved?

That Garcia stands charged for other related offenses and not only for plunder ought to have put Ms. Gutierrez on notice that this should have been treated with some degree of transparency as well as discretion. That Garcia has in fact been found guilty by a Court Martial for having unexplained wealth ought to have alerted Ms. Gutierrez to proceed with an overabundance of caution. Finally, that the deal itself smells--nay, stinks to high heavens--ought to have alerted Ms. Gutierrez that this might not be a deal she should be making.

More than the actual conviction of Garcia (which ought to have followed as a matter of the regular course of the performance of her duty as Ombudsman), the People of the Philippines ought to have been allowed the satisfaction of finding out the truth. Who orchestrated the plunder? Who else benefitted from it? Who else should be charged, tried, convicted and punished?

This is the essence of the toxic deal that Ms. Gutierrez is foisting on us. It poisons the entire truth-finding process set up by the most transparency-obsessed Constitution we have ever had and is a cyanide pill to finding out who robbed our soldiers blind. It is the best argument for a Truth Commission, not necessarily the one created by Executive Order No. 1, and is the final and most compelling reason to kick Gutierrez out of office.

The Eloquence of Silence

Apology: Sorry to cross post on current matters and off topic from Trial Techniques (well, not exactly way off); here's something on silence in the face of damning circumstances and what it speaks loudly of.

Rule 130, sec. 32 of the Rules on Evidence provides that "an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him." This admission is what is commonly referred to as an "admission by silence"

The reason behind it is quite simple and straightforward. It is based on human experience, as most of the rules on evidence are. The admission is premised on the natural and human instinct to defend oneself from any act or declaration that would be prejudicial to one's interest if made within earshot or in one's presence and when there is an opportunity to do so. If the act or declaration is such that it would have called for an automatic response and no response was made, then the silence is considered an admission of that fact.

A common analogy given is a bad joke that goes: Person A shouts at Person B, "Hey, you stupid jerk!" Person B retorts angrily, "Hey, I'm not stupid." As with most analogies, this one limps, though I think the point is made.

A more precise example, not analogy, perhaps would be Justice Ruben Reyes's initial silence to insinuations and loud hints that his office was behind the leak of the umpromulgated draft decision in the Limkaichong election case pending before the Supreme Court, which has led to a new controversy with certain quarters insisting on bringing in the Chief Justice.

One would think that Justice Reyes would have been so deafening in his protestations of innocence in the face of such serious insinuations. Yet, from all official and unofficial reports, his silence was the only thing that was deafening. It was only much later, ironically only when media started to pick it up, that Justice Reyes was loudly protesting his innocence (conveniently so, he hinted that any liability might have been from his staff; respondeat superior, Mr. Justice?)

Silence is often a good thing because it places many things in perspective. The eloquence of the silence that accompanied the press conference of Atty. Biraogo's announcement of the leaked draft--which naturally would have pointed only to Justice Reyes's Chambers--speaks volumes in this case.

Judicial Touch Move

In 1990, retired Supreme Court Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento, in Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, wrote:

"It perplexes me why this dissent should first of all merit what appears to be repartees from the majority. I am but casting a contrary vote, which, after all, is in performance of a constitutional duty.

I am also concerned at how this case has journeyed from ponente to ponente and opinion to opinion, which, rather than expedited its resolution, has delayed it-at the expense of the accused-petitioner.

I was originally assigned to write the decision in this case, and as early as June, 1989, I was ready. On June 14, 1989, I started circulating a decision granting the petition and declaring Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1878-A, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. Meanwhile, Madame Justice Irene Cortes disseminated a dissent. By July 18, 1989, my ponencia had been pending in the office of the Chief Justice for promulgation. It carried signatures of concurrence of eight Justices (including mine), a slim majority, but a majority nonetheless. Five Justices, on the other hand, joined Justice Cortes in her dissent. The Chief Justice did not sign the decision on his word that he was filing a dissent of his own.

Subsequently, and as events would soon unfold quickly and dramatically, the Chief Justice returned my decision to the Court en banc, and declared that unless somebody changed his mind, he was promulgating my decision. Justice Edgardo Paras, who was one of the eight who had stamped their imprimatur on my decision, indicated that he did not want to "clip the wings of the military" and that he was changing his mind. This sudden reversement under the circumstances surrounding its manifestation, took me aback for which I strongly voiced my protest for a case (although the majority is very slim) that I had thought was a settled matter.

I am aware that similar events in the Supreme Court are nothing uncommon. The following are the ringing words of my distinguished colleague, Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, but they could just as well have been mine, as far as the instant controversy is concerned, and I could not have put it any better:

It has taken all of a year and four months to what, I hope, will see the final disposition of this case, notwithstanding periodic reminders for an earlier resolution. It is this delay that has caused me a great deal of concern. It is, to me, a crying example of justice delayed and is by no means "much ado about nothing," ... Nor is the question involved "none too important." ... The bone of contention is whether or not a criminal complaint, which is an offense against the State, may be dismissed on the basis of an amicable settlement between the complainant and the accused, who is a public officer.

As assigned initially, I was to prepare the opinion of the Court. My original "ponencia" annulling the Order of respondent Municipal Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu dismissing the criminal case against respondent Mayor Emiliano Caruncho, granting the petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, and ordering respondent Municipal Judge to reinstate and proceed with the trial on the merits of the criminal case against respondent Mayor without further delay, was circulated beginning July 30, 1982."

Justice Sarmiento proceeded to convert his original ponencia into a dissenting opinion, which he published in full as a dissent.

I recalled this case from law school when I heard of the Limkaichong case which has led to impeachment whispers again, this time of the Chief Justice.

The Supreme Court is--or should be--well known for its reclusiveness and its almost obsessive compulsion for privacy (although one may argue that cannot be the case where a photogenic and articulate PIO like Midas Marquez trolls the screens of our television sets). Very little is known about its internal processes and what little is known is not always confirmed.

That is why the leaked draft (being attributed to the newly-retired Ruben Reyes, controversial in his own right by virtue merely of being a Justice) in the Limkaichong election case pending before the Supreme Court is such a big deal.

The former Congressman, whose wife stands to benefit from the Reyes draft if promulgated, has been making the rounds saying that the Justices are presumed to know what they are signing and if they have signed it, then it can't be changed anymore. Something akin to judicial "touch move", to borrow a phrase from the sport of Kings.

The dissent of Justice Sarmiento in Misolas v. Panga (quote above) clearly shows that it has happened before--at least twice on record as his dissent quotes another Justice who experienced a similar reversal of fortunes, the venerable Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in People v. Caruncho). In the Caruncho case, the new writer, Justice Abad Santos, made light of the circumstances by saying:

"This case is a good example of the saying: "much ado about nothing. And it serves as a reminder of the suggestion that we should relax, take it easy and not get unduly excited. For these reasons, a little whimsy is not out of place.

This case was originally assigned to Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera who was an outstanding student of the Chief Justice. The facts which led to the filing of the case had attracted national attention so it was thought that Justice Melencio-Herrera would once again pen a significant opinion. Due solely to the vagaries of chance, according to the Chief Justice, the lady justice was writing the decisions in leading cases. At one time Justice Antonio P. Barredo remarked that despite his long service with the Court he had not penned a landmark case. But that was before the Federation of Free Farmers case (107 SCRA 352-490 [1981]) which competes with the McDougal and Feliciano tomes in their soporific effects.

Justice Melencio-Herrera in fact already had a ponencia to which nine (9) other justices concurred. But alas, before it could be promulgated some of the brethren changed their minds. No, they did not exactly flip-flop; they merely flipped. Justice Melencio-Herrera has "threatened" to write a separate opinion and hopefully she will tell it all."

Not one to be intimidated or made light of, the Lady Justice from Cavite (direct descendant of Emilio Aguinaldo) quite pointedly replied to this:

"It has taken all of a year and four months to what, I hope, will see the final disposition of this case, notwithstanding periodic reminders for an earlier resolution. It is this delay that has caused me a great deal of concern. It is, to me, a crying example of justice delayed and is by no means "much ado about nothing" * Nor is the question involved "none too important." ** The bone of contention is whether or not a criminal complaint, which is an offense against the State, may be dismissed on the basis of an amicable settlement between the complainant and the accused, who is a public officer."

In Misolas, Caruncho and now Limkaichong, the Court changed its mind before promulgation of the Decision, which is the operative act for the effectivity of the Court's Decision. Anytime before the Court's Decision is promulgated, it may still be changed--as Justices Sarmiento and Melencio-Herrera and probably other Justices (who never told) discovered.

In all these instances, the Chief Justice was the determinative factor before a Decision could be promulgated. Does that indicate that the Chief Justice is partial, one way or the other? I do not believe so.

In discharging this function, the Chief Justice may be seen to operate on two levels--as an administrator and as a jurist. In the first role, he ensures that there is compliance with the number of votes so that the Decision may be promulgated. In the second role, he ensures that what the Court will be promulgating will carry weight.

That is apparently what Chief Justice Puno did in Limkaichong. While the number of votes was sufficient to indicate a ruling in favor of one party, the number of "in the result" votes cast sufficient doubts on the binding nature of the Decision for all future cases. It may be argued that the other Justices should simply have been polite enough to tell Justice Reyes that they could not go along with his reasoning; instead, they chose to do it with their votes. As Chief Justice, it was the role of Puno to ensure that what emerged from the Court would not be something that would apply only to a specific person in a specific instance but would be good enough to be a rule for many ages to come.

I am not an apologist for the current Chief Justice though I have written favorably about him. (I still cannot read the Gloria Arroyo legitimacy case without cringing at the triple hearsay rule adopted by the Court in that case.) But there is a line between legitimate criticism of the Court and its Justices and outright political maneuverings. Right now, I do not see the legitimate criticism, especially of the Chief Justice because all I see are the political maneuverings.

The First

(Note: While this is not strictly on trial techniques, I think this may be of interest. From my other blog Vincula. Some points have been changed to suit the tenor of this particular blog)

"While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this Court."

Chief Justice Reynato Puno starts his Decision in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906 in this way. Read the decision here.

It's a petition that was first filed as a prohibition suit which later, after the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was passed, became an amparo petition--the very first in the Supreme Court and the very first in the Court of Appeals.

This case is significant for human rights protection. The Court, through the Chief Justice, came up with an expanded and expansive reading of the right to security, which bodes well for the protection of rights.

I'm proud to have been part of the team that litigated this. Kudos to Bombi Sunga, FLAG Deputy Coordinator for Metro Manila for first taking this case on, when the Manalo Brothers disappeared and litigating this issue before the CA as a habeas corpus case and to Jose Manuel Diokno, FLAG National Chair, for shepherding us through this case. Also to Cookie Diokno, FLAG Secretary General, for the great staff support.

Passing the Bar and Winning Cases

Many lawyers still remember where they were and what they were doing when they heard the results of their bar examinations, pass or fail. Many bar takers still remember with eerie detail every single thing they did (or were doing) at a particular Sunday of the bar examinations. That is how big a deal the bar exam is to a lawyer--it can, forever, change your life--literally.

It is four (for some five or six) years of studying law, five (for some its more) months of intense review (for some, learning for the first time)--cramming as much information about a given subject, all the possible permutations of questions, all the relevant case law, all the challenges that could possibly arise--into one day. When that day is done, the process repeats itself again for a second week, a third and then the fourth.

Reflecting on this, these questions inevitably arise--why do I go through this (other than that I have to pass the bar to become a lawyer) and what do i get out of this?

The obvious answer, of course, is you have to pass the bar to become a lawyer and to practice law. But on deeper reflection, preparing to take the bar and actually taking the bar prepares you also for lawyering, particularly trial lawyering in many ways.

1. Preparation is everything. Native intelligence can only get you so far. For many, the preparations for the bar start from the very first day of law school--adjusting to a new environment, acquiring or adjusting study habits, keeping personal order and managing time well. All these complement native intelligence to ensure a successful bar exam, and also a successful trial practice.

Many trial lawyers prepare for a case weeks and months on end. The good ones make it look so easy and effortless, but that is only because they have already spent a good deal of time preparing. You can always spot those who are unprepared (note: there is no such thing as "not completely prepared", one is either prepared or not)--they will ramble on and on, use technical language to hide lack of meaning in their words; on the other hand, the prepared trial lawyers are those who can communicate easily, using comfortable words to convey exactly what they want to say--and, to do this, preparation is key.

In the same way that you cannot hope to cram for the bar and hope to pass; you can also not cram for a trial and hope to win.

2. Anticipating challenges is key. How many bar candidates have walked down taft avenue, clutching mountains of tips and reviewers, reached the gate and discovered that their building was at the other end and that it would have been much easier to go through the other side? How many have walked up to the gate only to realize that their permit or identification card or fountain/sign pens were left behind? Or that the first day of the Bar (at least in the Philippines) is always a circus and that lead time is always at least one hour ahead?

Many of these things lead to stress and tension which are avoidable if challenges are anticipated early enough. One obstacle to successfully taking the bar is anticipating what might possibly arise (of course a good balance must be struck between anticipating what may reasonably arise and worrying needlessly about a far too remote contingency) and, sounding like a defective cd, preparing for it ahead of time.

Like the bar, anticipating challenges is key in a successful trial. Is it the first time you're appearing before this court? Do you even know where it is? Do you know how far the parking area is? Do you know how long it takes to get there? What's the judge like? Does s/he start on time? Do you know where the rest room is?

Many a trial has been won (or lost) simply on a favorable first impression created by a counsel who is ready for anything the judge throws his way. And, while it may seem trivial, knowing where the parking area is or even where the rest room is, spells the difference between a less stress hearing/trial and one where you are rushing around, trying vainly to find a place to park your car or, in the event of stomach upset, your butt.

3. You can't do it alone. The first thing a bar candidate realizes when he takes the bar is the enormity of the entire task. No one, no matter how good, will ever be able to take on the bar completely by him/herself. There will always be a need for support, in whatever form that will be.

Schools now have fully-functional, well-organized (and for some law schools, well-funded) bar operations; an annual exercise in school spirit that is intended to make the bar exam experience as easy as possible on the one taking it. The essence of bar operations is simply to help the examinee get through the examinations by eliminating or minimizing some of the things s/he needs to do so that s/he can have more time to prepare to take the exam. So, you will have gophers (the human, not the animal kind; for those unfamiliar, it is slang for one who is asked to "go-pher this" and "go-pher that") running around getting breakfast and lunch for the examinees, getting "tips", organizing religious services (A Jesuit priest never tires of reminding people that during the bar, there are no atheists) or simply being present.

4. Put everything into it. You can't take the bar half-heartedly as this will only assure that you will fail it wholeheartedly. Whether or not you feel you are confident, you have to summon the heart, the will to take it.

The same thing with trying a case. You've got to put everything into it--all the preparations, cramming, memorizing for one whole week into one day; and then do it all over again, and again, and again, over and over.

One word sums up what you need to be able to do that: Passion. You've got to be able to summon the passion to take the bar confidently and to try cases the same way. Stand up and say, passionately, "this is going to happen."

One last thing and this applies only to taking the bar. You don't want to go that way again. And that needs no explanation.